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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS JuDiciAL ARTICLE

At a time when the population of Illinois totalled less than 55,000,
the framers of the first state constitution drafted a judicial article which
vested the judicial power of the state in a supreme court composed of a
chief justice and three associates, which judges were to be selected by the
legislature and were to serve during good behavior.' The framers left the
duty of providing all necessary inferior nisi prius courts to the general
assembly which was also directed to appoint a "competent number of
justices of the peace" to serve in each county. 2 The judicial department
thus fabricated to serve the frontier conditions which then prevailed
proved adequate, particularly since the new constitution authorized an
increase in the number of reviewing judges whenever conditions should so
require.' Such local problems as did arise were met, from time to time,
by legislative exercise of the reserved power to create inferior tribunals
4
when and where needed.
Within the next thirty years, however, the population of the state
increased some sixteen fold.5 For that matter, the political complexion of
both the state and the nation had also changed. Those who drafted the
1848 constitution, therefore, responding to the new conditions, fixed a
revised judicial department upon the state which embodied ideas that
dominate the political scene today. Broadly speaking, the principal
change produced by the second constitution came with the introduction of
the concept of popular election for all state as well as for many local
officials. Members of the judiciary were to be selected in the same manner
and were to serve for stated terms.' Other factors operated to produce a
reduction in the size of the supreme court. 7 It was limited to three mem1 Ill. Const. 1818, Art. IV, §§ 1, 3, and 4.

2 Ibid., §§ 1 and 8.
3 Ibid., § 3.

4 The legislature, for example, created courts of county commissioners by Act
of March 22, 1819; established probate courts under Laws 1828, p. 37; created
an extra circuit court for the area north of the Illinois River by Laws 1828, p. 38;
set up a municipal court for Chicago under Laws 1837, p. 75; a mayor's court
for Springfield by Laws 1839, p. 12, § 8; a county court for Cook County, and for
other counties, pursuant to Laws 1845, pp. 74 and 275; as well as produced a
substantial revision, including an increase in the size of the supreme court, through
the medium of Laws 1841, p. 173.
5 Encyclo. Americana, Vol. 14, p. 682, gives the 1820 census as 55,211 and the
1850 census as 851,470.
6 Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V, §§ 3, 7 and 17. See also Verlie, Illinois Constitutions
(Ill. State Hist. Coll., Springfield, 1919), Vol. XIII, p. xxiii.
7Verlie, op. cit., p. xxiii, cites an early instance of state supreme court packing for political purposes.
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bers whose individual salaries were set at $1,200 per year with the proviso
that the judges should be ineligible for other public office for the space of
one year after their terms had expired.
Actually, the overall size of the judiciary was increased for the 1848
constitution established a series of circuit courts to sit in some nine designated judicial circuits conducting at least two terms each year and empowered to exercise original jurisdiction "in all cases at law and equity"
and in cases of "appeals from all inferior courts." 8 These courts were
staffed by elected circuit judges chosen for a six-year term and paid the
constitutionally limited wage of $1,000 per annum. 9 In addition, county
courts were authorized for each county, also to be staffed by elected judges
to be chosen locally for a four-year term of office. These courts were to
deal with probate matters, such civil jurisdiction as the legislature might
prescribe, and to handle those criminal cases which the legislature might
designate so long as the punishment was by fine only, and then not to
exceed one hundred dollars.' 0 Other concepts, such as one calling for the
use of the staggered term," another prescribing qualifications for judicial
office, 12 and a third setting a date for judicial elections independent of the
one used for the election of other state officials, 13 were then introduced and
still prevail.
Again, the constitutional system so devised could have proved to be an
excellent one, at least for the times, but its framers erred in failing to look
far enough into the future. Scarcely a decade later, the population had
doubled and, with the advent of the Civil War, industrial and social change
progressed amazingly. Inflationary trends turned fixed salaries, especially
those fixed at a parsimonious level, into a source of extreme hardship.
Abortive attempts, in 1862, to secure constitutional revision failed because
of partisan influences,' 4 but the failure merely served to emphasize the
objectionable features of the 1848 system. As the population grew,' 5 and
the volume of business increased, the flood of litigation swelled to almost
overwhelming proportions but the general assembly could, constitutionally,
do nothing to increase the number of courts nor add needed members to
the staff of the three-man supreme court.
Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V,
9 Ibid., § 10.
8

§§ 7 and 8.

Ibid., §§ 16, 17 and 18.
11 Ibid., § 4. The section also served to develop the concept that the judge with
10

the oldest commission should act as chief justice of the supreme court.
12 Ibid., § 11.
13 Ibid., § 13-15.
14 See King, Melville Weston Fuller--Chief Justice of the United States 18881910 (Macmillan Company, New York, 1950), pp. 48-52.
15 It stood at 2,539,891 in the 1870 census: Encyclo. Americana, Vol. 14, p. 682-
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By 1870, with the adoption of the present constitution, some degree
of relief was attained, but the solution then devised amounted to little
more than an increase in the number of courts and in the size of the
judiciary, for the integral structure of the judicial department, fashioned
under the 1848 constitution, remained about the same. True, intermediate
appellate courts were authorized, 16 probate courts were to be set up in certain counties, i" police magistrates were added at the lower level, i8 and Cook
County was split off as a single circuit with its own judicial scheme, 19 but
this meant little more than an internal parcelling out of the judicial function into smaller units and among more hands without furnishing any true
revision. The vice of the elective system was retained under pressure for
more, and ever more, popular control of government.
In the years since 1870, there has been little chance to revise the state
constitution and only a few amendments have been made to it. Nevertheless, as early as 1893, there was a feeling developing that a thorough reexamination of the judicial articles was especially imperative. 20 When it
became apparent that it was hopeless to expect any substantial degree of
revision, energy was directed toward the securing of the passage of single
changes. The complexity produced by attempting to govern a city as large
as Chicago had come to be by the turn of the century generated the "Home
Rule" amendment of 1904. It led to the creation of the Municipal Court
22
of Chicago,21 which in turn became the model for other municipal courts,
but beyond this there has been no substantial change in the form of the
judicial department of the state since it received its shape over one hundred years ago.

23

At the present time, the judicial organization is composed of one
supreme court staffed by seven men; four appellate courts, one of which is
divided internally into three divisions; a series of circuit courts arranged
in some seventeen circuits extending throughout the state exclusive of
Cook County, presided over by some fifty-five circuit judges; twenty-eight
city courts located in as many strategic cities of substantial size; one hundred and two county courts, each staffed by a single judge; thirteen probate courts; and an untold number of justices of the peace and police
16 Il. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 11.
17 Ibid., § 20.
18 Ibid., § 21.

19 Ibid., §§ 23 and 26.
20 See Verlie, op. cit., p. xxxi.
21 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34.
22

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 442 et seq., represents an exercise, by

the legislature, of the power to create courts "in and for cities and incorporated
towns" given by Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1.
23 In the meantime, the population has expanded from the 851,470 of the 1850
census to a figure of around 8,750,000 in 1950.
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magistrates. 24 In addition, Cook County is served by a circuit court composed of twenty judges and a superior court, possessing concurrent jurisdiction, with a staff of twenty-eight, some of which judges serve in the
Criminal Court of Cook County or in the Family Court branch of the
Circuit Court. There is also a Municipal Court of Chicago, possessed of
thirty-six associate judges and a chief justice, and the nearby suburb of
Evanston has its municipal court presided over by two judges.
Naturally, with such a wide distribution of judicial power among so
many judges, with an attendant overlapping of jurisdiction in many instances among the trial courts, but with no efficient way of making the
parts work in harmony with or supplement one another, the cry has again
arisen for a true revision of at least this one aspect of the state constitution. Bar association committees, heretofore working independently, have
now been merged into a Joint Committee of the Illinois State and Chicago
Bar Associations.2 5 That group, after extended executive sessions lasting
many days, has now reported its proposed draft of a new judicial article
to replace present Article VI of the 1870 Constitution. The draft has received the approval of the managing boards of the two professional associations, is presently being discussed in conferences sponsored by the law
schools located within the state,, and will probably be submitted for legislative action at the next session of the General Assembly.
Before that time, every lawyer and law student in the state should
become familiar with its provisions and formulate his own opinion as to
the wisdom and the legality of the proposal. The practicing lawyer has,
from his experience at the bar, already formed an impression as to the
need and desirability for change. In the interest of wholesome development in the fundamental law of the state, it is planned, in subsequent
issues, to provide an explanation of, and appropriate comment on, the
sections of the proposed judicial article and its accompanying schedule. 26
W.

F.

ZACHARIAS

MODERNIZING THE LAW OiF PERPErUITIES

Mastery over the rule against perpetuities as a mathematical proposition represents only a beginning for the draftsman of complicated wills
and trusts. The creation of interests which will be absolutely certain not
24
25

See Directory of the Judiciary Department, 344 Ill. App. ill, et seq.
Announcement of the formation of the joint committee appears in 39 Il1. B. J.

625.
26The schedule, designed to integrate the revision Into the existing judicial
organization without causing too much disruption, is reserved for publication at
a later time. Persons desiring copies of the full text of the proposed article and
the schedule should communicate with Mr. Barnabas F. Sears, Chairman of the
joint committee, 111 Downer Street, Aurora, Illinois, or Professor Rubin G. Cohn,
Secretary, College of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
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to violate the mathematical confines of the rule yet which will serve the
purposes of his client offers an additional task requiring a general consciousness of perpetuities and their pitfalls.' As the rule demands absolute certainty that interests created must vest, if at all, within the stated
period, 2 that certainty is actually a theoretical one which must be established at the time the instrument is to take effect. Even though events
which transpire do, in actuality, justify an assumption that the unlikely
will not occur, i. e. that the gift will not vest beyond the period of perpetuities, nevertheless, it is an axiom of perpetuities law that probabilities
are not to be considered, 3 even in cases where vesting in fact occurs within
the time allowed.4 The policy of the rule, one favoring certainty of title,
is not open to challenge, but it deserves re-examination when applied to
certain "hard" cases, for the principle of absolute certainty has been
rigorously applied in cases where the facts were such that they all but
5
compelled a vesting within the required period.
1 Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests (Burdette Smith Co.,
Chicago, 1941), § 472, pp. 580-1.
2 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1942), 4th Ed.,
§§ 201 and 214. The necessity for this certainty is emphasized by Gray's wellknown statement of the rule, appearing in § 201, that no "interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."
3 Gray, op. cit., § 214. For a criticism of the "might-have-been rule," see Leach,
"Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952), particularly pp. 728,
747.
4 This almost universally applied common law principle was reversed in Pennsylvania by the passage of the Estates Act of 1947, Pa. Laws 1947, Act. No. 39.
Section 4 thereof provides, in part, that upon "the expiration of the period allowed
by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than
possible events, any interest not then vested and any interest in members of a
class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void . .
The committee which sponsored this act commented that the provision in question
was "intended to disturb the common law rule as little as possible, but to make
actualities at the end of the period, rather than possibilities as of the creation
of the interest, govern, and to provide a more equitable disposition of void gifts.
By regarding actualities at the end of the period, the unrealistic results based on
purely theoretical possibilities are avoided. The possibility test seems peculiarly
inappropriate in most Pennsylvania cases because by the time the courts do decide
upon the validity of the remainders, possibilities have become actualities. This
results because (1) the modern tendency is to uphold valid life estates even
though the ultimate remainder seems obviously void, and (2) the court refuses
to decide on the validity of future estates until the termination of the valid life
estate. See Quigley's Est., 198 A. 85, 329 Pa. 281, on both points." Purdon's Pa.
State. Ann., Title 20, § 301.4(b), and comment thereon at p. 475.
See also
comment in 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1158 (1950), particularly p. 1166.
5 Thus a gift to such of a woman's children who shall reach the age of twentyfive would be too remote, even though the named woman be then eighty years
old. The possibility that she may have more children prevents the use of the
lives of existing children as the measuring rod and, although medical science
recognizes that birth of more children to such a person would be a physical impossibility, yet the law conclusively presumes that a possibility exists: Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox 324 (Ch. 1787).
This principle has been accepted in Illinois:
Kane v. Schofield, 332 Ill. App. 505 at 522, 76 N. E. (2d) 216 at 224 (1947).
See
also Gray, op. cit., § 215, and annotation in 146 A. L. R. 794 (1943).
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The principle in question, one proclaiming that a possibility of vesting within the period will not suffice, was nicely illustrated some years ago
by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Johnson v. Preston.6 The
testator there gave certain lands to his executor, to have and to hold for a
term of years "from and after the date of the probate of this will."
It
was held that the gift to the executor was void for remoteness as it might
not vest, i. e. the will might not be probated, within the period of the
perpetuities rule. That view was later affirmed in Ryan v. Beshk 7 where
property was given in remainder to four named persons if living at the
time of distribution, but if any should die before that time, the share of
the one so dying should go "to his or her executor or administrator to be
applied" as if such decedent had owned the property. It was held that,
all remainders being contingent, the gifts over to the personal representatives were too remote.
Although these cases may be said to be technically correct, they may
be criticized. It is possible that a will may not be probated until a remote
time s but violation of the rule is so unlikely that the requirement of
prospective certainty will operate harshly in such case. Especially in
Illinois will this type of violation be unusual, for the Illinois Probate Act
has been framed so as to promote the speedy settlement of decedent's
estates. 9 The lack of cases of the type mentioned may indicate that the
Johnson and Ryan decisions have operated to teach the lesson and, until
1948, the avoidance of this particular pitfall does not appear to have
caused any undue warping of estate plans.
With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948, however, alert lawyers soon pointed out that a bequest or devise in trust to an estate could
6 226 Ill. 447, 80 N. E. 1001 (1907).
7 339 Ill. 45, 170 N. E. 699 (1930).
There is, however, authority to the contrary for in Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893), the court held a
gift to vest fourteen years after settlement of the testator's estate to be valid.
In view of the executor's fiduciary duty to settle the estate promptly, the court
found that the time of administration could not last for so long as seven years
after the testator's decease.
8 Gray, op. cit., § 214.3, note 1, cites a case where the will was not proved for
sixty-three years.
9 Under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 212, a person having possession of
the will must deliver it to the clerk of the probate court immediately upon death
of the testator and the court is empowered to compel production of the will on its
own motion. The destruction or secreting of a will is made a criminal offense by
Section 213. The executor, according to Section 214, has a duty to institute
proceedings for probate of the will within 30 days after he has been notified of
his appointment. His failure to file an inventory within the required period fixed
by Section 323, or to make proper accounting, is not only ground for his removal
under Section 430(g) but may justify commitment to jail pursuant to Section 457.
In addition, one who, without good cause, fails to close an estate within two
years after issuance of letters to him is charged, according to Section 462, with
interest at ten per cent. per anum on the fair market value of all personal estate
which has come into his control. It might be noted that counterparts of these
provisions were in force when the case of Johnson v. Preston was decided.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

be a useful device in qualifying the gift for a "marital deduction" permitted in connection with the federal estate tax. 10 The validity of such a
bequest or devise has, therefore, assumed new importance. While the
law allows a deduction of that property included in the gross estate which
passes to the surviving spouse, at least to the extent of one-half of the
"adjusted gross estate,"11 a disposition which passes only a life interest
or a "terminable" interest to the spouse will not qualify for the deduction. 12 On the other hand, a gift in trust for the benefit of the surviving
spouse for life, with power in the life-tenant beneficiary to appoint to
herself, or to her estate, will qualify.' 3 If, as has been pointed out, such
an appointment would be held to be a nullity under local perpetuities
law, 14 the total gift to the spouse would then constitute no more than a life
estate or other "terminable" interest, 15 hence would be inadequate for
purpose of the deduction. Until recently, then, before a draftsman could
qualify such a gift for the marital deduction, it was necessary for him to
draft a provision which would comply both with the rule against perpetuities and with the provisions of the federal estate tax law.
The hitherto relatively dormant decisions in the Johnson and Ryan
cases have, therefore, suddenly been projected into the limelight, for the
doctrine there laid down could affect many a testamentary gift planned
by one who wished to give a limited interest to the surviving spouse for
life but who also desired to take advantage of the marital deduction.
What had, previously, been only an occasional inconvenience, now assumes
the proportions of a regular addition to the burdens laid on the draftsman.
Fortunately, for Illinois, the potential size of the problem induced
the legislature, at its last session, to enact a bill which is now listed as
Section 153a of the Conveyances Act. It declares that the "vesting of
any limitation of property, whether created in the exercise of a power of
appointment or in any other manner, shall not be regarded as deferred
for purposes of the rule against perpetuities merely because the limitation
is made to the estate of a person or to a personal representative, or to a
trustee under a will, or to take effect on the probate of a will. The provisions of the Act shall apply only to limitations created after the effective
10 See Casner, "Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948--The Regulations," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949), particularly pp. 101-2.
1126 U. S. C. A., § 812(e) (1) (A), and § 812(e) (1) (H).
12 Ibid., § 812(e) (1) (B).
13 Ibid., § 812(e) (1)(F). A "non-appointive" trust may also qualify for the
marital deductions: Reg. 105, § 81.47a (b) (2). See generally, Lasser, Estate Tax
Handbook (Matthew Bender Co., Albany, New York, 1951), pp. 602 and 617.
14 See notes 6 and 7, ante.
15 Casner, "Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948-The Regulations,"
63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949), particularly pp. 101-2.
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date hereof.' 16 It is the gist of the new section that the mere theoretical
possibility of too-remote vesting should not serve to invalidate the planned
disposition of an estate, but the statute should not be read in too broad a
fashion. The words indicating that the vesting should not be regarded as
deferred "merely because the limitation is made to the estate of a person,"
would also support the negative inference that other events could cause the
vesting to be regarded as a tardy one. In the absence of such events,
however, there is no room for judicial discretion for the statute is expressed in the form of a command.
One relying on the new statute should note that the four kinds of disposition mentioned are really no more than formal variations of the same
thing, i. e. a gift to the estate of a person. Being of limited scope, in that
it withholds the common law requirement of advance theoretical certainty
of vesting in the one specialized case, the statute does not specifically
lengthen the period of perpetuities. The language thereof might serve,
however, to support the inference that the answer to the question as to
whether or not the common law period of perpetuities has been exceeded
is to be ascertained retrospectively, as a matter of fact, 17 rather than
prospectively as a matter of theory.' 8
It should also be noted that the basic policy of the rule against perpetuities, one designed to prevent the tying up of property for too long a
time after the donor's death, is not seriously compromised, if it is compromised at all. In the case of a grant to "A for life with remainder to
such person, including A's personal representatives, as A shall by will
appoint," there is the admitted possibility that the estate might not be
settled, nor letters taken out, for more than twenty-one years after A's
death. In such event, an appointment to A's personal representative would,
when read back into the instrument creating the power, admittedly violate
the common law rule as applied in the Johnson and Ryan cases. Under the
new statute, however, the appointed interest will not be regarded as deferred and void merely because of the form of the limitation. Although
title may, under the statute, remain uncertain and unmarketable for the
period of perpetuities, since vesting will be contingent upon settlement of
A's estate, nevertheless this delay in vesting is clearly within the policy
of the rule. It is further apparent, under Illinois law,19 that the uncer16 I1.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153a. The legislation was drafted and
proposed by the Committee on Trust Law, Chicago Bar Association, of which
Daniel M. Schuyler was chairman.
17 The broader provision to be found in Pennsylvania, note 4 ante, is specific on
the point.
18 Constitutional problems relating to retroactive application of statutes concerning property have been avoided by making the Illinois provision apply solely
to limitations created after the effective date of the new statute.
19 See note 9. anto
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tainty may be readily dispelled by persons interested in the title, for the
Probate Act provides that any person may petition to have the will probated. 21 If the statute be construed to permit a limitation which in fact
vests at a time more remote than the period of perpetuities, then the policy
of the rule is somewhat compromised; but such cases would be extremely
rare.
On the whole, it would seem that, except to those who might wish to
cling to outworn "landmarks of the law" merely for the sake of perpetuating the lore with which they are familiar, the new statute provides a
great convenience for those engaged in the drafting of marital deduction
trusts. It offers a convenience, in fact, which, regardless of any subsequent change in the tax law which stimulated its adoption, should continue
to be a useful and reasonable provision entirely consistent with the general
policy of the law relating to perpetuities.
R. K. LARSON

20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 215.

